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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
complainant to the defendant was not paid, the purchase
money to be applied on account of the amount so due.
Rule 8. United Drug Company v. Kovacs," is an
authority for the rule that while a court of equity which
has obtained jurisdiction for any purpose will ordinarily
round out the whole circle of controversy between the par-
ties, still it cannot do this as to a right based on a statute
which clearly specifies an entirely different jurisdiction for
establishing and enforcing the liability.
A full and complete discussion of the application of
this maxim cannot be presented in a few rules as stated
above, but, the author feels that these rules cover the vast
majority of the cases wherein the maxim has been followed.
W. HUDSON R. UNGER.
WIDOW'S AND CHILDREN'S EX'EMPTION IN
PENNSYLVANIA.-"The widow shall remain in her hus-o
band's capital mansion house for forty days after his death
during which time her dower shall be assigned. These
forty days are called the widow's quarantine.".' Thus ori-
ginated what today in Pennsylvania is known as the
"widow's and children's exemption." The purpose of such
an allotment is to protect the family from financial dis-
tress in the period immediately following the death of the
husband or father, so that one bereavement be not follow-
ed by another - loss of subsistence.2
The present statutory authorization allowing the
widow's exemption is Section 12a of the Fiduciaries Act of
1917' which, in effect, provides that the widow, or children,
in case of no widow, shall retain property or the proceeds
thereof in the amount of five hundred dollars.. Section 6
of the Intestate Act of 19171 providing that one year's wilful
and malicious desertion by a wife shall forfeit her interest
in the deceased's estate has no application in determining
the validity of a widow's claim for exemption under the
Fiduciaries Act. 5
14279 Pa. 133 (1924).
'Blackstone's Commentaries. Vol. 2, Ch. 8, Page 135.
2Sipes v. Mann, 39 Pa. 414 (1861); McGovern's Estate, 19 Berks
(Pa.) 347 (1927).
8p. L. 447.
4P. L. 829.5Braum's Estate, 86 Pa. Super. 245 (1926); Stauffer's Estate, 89
Pa. Super. $31 1926).
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The widow's exemption is neither a title nor interest
passing under the intestate laws,6 nor an estate of inherit-
ance7 but is a pure gratuity by force of law,8 an independ-
ent bounty,9 dependent upon residence within this Common-
wealth 10 and the family relationship."' Since the right has
the above characteristics, it follows that a demand for the
same is necessary.' 2
The widow then, as a general rule, can take her exemp-
tion when it appears that she has discharged her duties as
a wife. The fact that there has been a separation and the
husband has secured a divorce void in Pennsylvania' s or
has left the wife without just cause 14 will not debar the
widow's claim. The widow may elect to claim her exemp-
tion in addition to a bequest in her late husband's will.' 5
The claim for exemption on the part of the widow is
barred where the wife is living apart from her husband
without such reasonable cause as would have entitled her
to a divorce.' That being the rule, it follows that where
the separation is by mutual consent there can be no valid
claim for exemption.7 So, where the wife has voluntarily
and wilfully deserted the husband ;18 likewise where there
has been a formal separation and release, the widow's claim
is barred.' In the case of a widow having secured a di-
vorce a menso et thoro, her right of exemption is cut off, 20
OHildebrand's Estate, 262 Pa. 112 (1918); Stauffer's Estate, supra.
7Hildebrand's Estate, supra; Buckland's Estate, 239 Pa: 608
(1913); Peeble's Estate, 157 Pa. 605 (1893); Stauffer's Estate, supra.
8Sipes v. Mann, supra; Stauffer's Estate, supra.
9Note 7.
'
0 Platt's Appeal, 80 Pa. 501 (1876).
"Crawford's Estate, 81 Pa. Super. 222 (1923); Lane's Estate, 6
Dist. (Pa.) 618 (1897). Leading Case.
12Andrew's Estate, 10 Erie (Pa.) 9 (1926).
'3Platt's Appeal, 80 Pa. 501 (1876).
14 Terry's Appeal, 55 Pa. 344 (1867); Schwartz's Estate, 10 D.
& C. (Pa.) 674 (1925).
15Peeble's Estate, supra; Compher v. Compher, 25 Pa. 31 (1855);
Wittel's Estate, 10 Erie (Pa.) 80 (1928).
'"Nye's Appeal, 126 Pa. 341 (1889). Leading Case.
17Stauffer's Estate, supra; Crawford's Estate, supra.
IsBraurn's Estate, supra; Ross' Estate, 6 Kulp (Pa.) 521 (1892).
l9Speidel's Appeal, 107 Pa. 18 (1884); Odiorne's Appeal, 54 Pa.
175 (1867).
20Hettrick v. Hetrick, 55 Pa. 290 (1867); Fyock's Estate, 9 Lanc.
L. R. (Pa.) 89 (1875),
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and where the widow has relied on a voidable divorce for
thirty years the result is the same2
Since it has been shown when the widow may and may
not take the exemption, it is now fitting to consider the
children's right to exemption. Where there is no widow,
2 2
and the surviving children have maintained the family re-
lationship with the lately deceased widower, 2 they are
entitled to the exemption of five hundred dollars. This is
so even though the children are adult and are not depen-
dent upon him for support.24  An interesting problem arises
in the case of an adult daughter, married, who together
with her husband is maintaining the family relationship
with her father. There are no appellate decisions on the
question and the inferior courts are in conflict. In Steele's
Estate, 5 the court held such children not to be within the
purview of the act. The reason assigned was that the act
had in view the aid of financially distressed widows and
children. On the other hand, in Stephenson's Estate,26
the opposite result was reached. The latter case seems
more sound because the right to take the exemption is not
dependent upon the financial status of the w'dow, the statu-
tes being silent on that point. Therefore, he right of the
children to take the exemption, in absence of a widow,
should not be dependent upon their extrinsic means of
support.
Concerning the interesting question as to whether
surviving children can take from a widow's estate, the
courts have swayed from one side to the other by various
obiter dicta, the final result being found in the three follow-
ing cases. The first, King's Appeal,27 held that the children
could not take the exemption from their mother's estate
where the father survives and by dictum says that
children can never take from their mother. The next,
2 8
limited the above case and held that children could take
their exemption when their father had been absent for
seven years (presumably dead). The last,29 in turn limited
"Limnber's Estate, 284 Pa. 346 (1925).22Alexander's Estate, 13 Phila. (Pa.) 564 (1878).
23Geheringer's Estate, 10 D. & C. (Pa.) 279 (1927).
24Geheringer's Estate, supra; Hornberger's Estate, 30 Dist. (Pa.)
907 (1921); Lane's Estate, supra.
2513 Phila. (Pa.) 398 (1880).
2641 C. C. (Pa.) 260 (1913). See also Hornberger's Estate, supra.
2784 Pa. 345 (1877).
2SHime's Appeal, 94 Pa. 381 (1880).
2
"Wanger's Appeal, 105 Pa. 346 (1884).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
the second case so that where a wife has been devised pro-
perty which is bound by liens, on the widow's death the
claim of the creditors is superior to that of the children.
What amounts to a waiver or release of the widow's
right to retain her exemption? Clearly, the right is re-
leased by an ante-nuptial agreement,3 0 waiving all rights in
her husband's estate and the result is the same in the case
of a post-nuptial agreement." There is no definite time
for making the claim, but it must be made before the estate
has so changed, that expense and embarrassment would re-
sult from the allowance of the claim.3 2 Of course, she has
no right of exemption where she has married again, with-
out receiving her claim. 8 If the widow has taken part of
the five hundred dollars from the personalty and has made
no claim for the remainder due her, prior to a sale of the
realty, she will be deemed to have waived her right,"4 as
where she has made a claim antagonistic to the funds from
which she now seeks her exemption."3
As a general rule, the widow's and children's exemp-
tion is allowed regardless of whether the decedent died
testate or intestate, or whether the estate is solvent or in-
solvent. 86 The widow's claim takes precedence to debts
not liens, 7 judgments that are liens,38 distraint of landlord
on a lease made by the decedent,39 mechanic's liens,"° tax
claims, 41 funeral expenses of the decedent,4 2 and claims of
the United States for overpayments made to the decedent
for disabilities received in the late war.4  However, there
BOTiernan v. Binns, 92 Pa. 248 (1879).
B'Haerdler's Estate, 81 Pa. Super. 168 (1923).
32Lane's Estate, supra.
33Burk v. Gleason, 46 Pa. 297 (1863).
84Hutrnan's Appeal, 81 Pa. 329 (1876). See also Baskin's Appeal,
38 Pa. 65 (1860) and Davis' Appeal, 34 Pa. 246 (1859).
35Couritryman's Estate, 151 Pa. 577 (1892).
36Baldy's Appeal, 40 Pa. 328 (1861); Hill v. Hill, 32 Pa. 511 (1859);
Compher v. Compher, supra.
37Hill v. Hill, supra.
38Kauffman's Appeal, 112 Pa. 645 (1886); Notter's Appeal, 45 Pa.
361 (1863); Spencer's Appeal, 27 Pa. 218 (1856).
39Sweeney v. Dumont, 36 C. C. (Pa.) 552 (1909).
4OHildebrand's Appeal, 39 Pa. 133 (1861).
4lAllentown's Appeal, 109 Pa. 75 (1885).
'2Weir's Estate, 20 Phila. (Pa.) 146 (1891); Luke's Estate, 17
Phila. (Pa.) 517 (1885).
'
8 Jones' Estate, 84 Pa. Super. 170 (1924).
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are two cases in which the widow's claim is not superior.
Where the decedent had executed a mortgage, the mort-
gagee has priority over the claim of the widow," and the
costs of the administration also take priority to the right of
the widow.4 5 The reason assigned in the last case is that
such expenses are incurred in the ascertainment of the
amount of the estate without which, the estate has not legal
existence.4" It is submitted, however, that since the pur-
pose of the exemption is to furnish subsistence until the
estate has been ascertained, the exemption should take
precedence to the costs of the administration of the estate.
W. ROBERT THOMPSON.
CREATION AND TAXATION OF JOINT BANK DE-
POSITS-The first situation to be considered is the case
in which a deposit is made in a bank by one person in the
names of two others. If these two persons are not hus-
band and wife the deposit will create a joint-tenancy. At
common law the right of survivorship was an incident of a
joint-tenancy. But this right of survivorship has been
abolished by the Act of March 31, 1812, 5 Sm. L. 395.1 Thus,
a mere deposit in the names of two persons not husband
and wife would by virtue of the Act of 1812 create a joint-
tenancy without the right of suvivorship. Therefore, up-
on the death of one of the persons in whose name the de-
posit is made, the decedent's interest in the fund would not
vest in the survivor by operation of the right of survivor-
ship, and could, consequently, be subjected to an inheritance
tax. But if in the creation of the joint -tenancy it has been
provided 2 that the right of survivorship shall apply, then
upon the death of one of the joint-tenants, the survivor is
deemed to be the sole owner by virtue of the right of sur-
vivorship s and a tax levied upon the decedent's interest in
the fund is improper. The reason for this is that the Act
44Kauffman's Appeal, supra; Allentown's Appeal, supra; Nerpel's
Appeal, 91 Pa. 334 (1879).
45McIntyre's Estate, 44 C. C. (Pa.) 111 (1915)'.
'
8 Weir's Estate, supra.
'Mardis, Admrx. v. Steen, 293 Pa. 13, 16.
2Arnold v. Jack's Admr., 24 Pa. 57 (right of survivorship given by
direction of testator) ; Redemptorist's Fathers v. Lawler, 205 Pa.
24; Kerr v. Verner, 66 Pa. 326; Jones v. Cable, 114 Pa. 586; Lentz
v. Lentz, 2 Phila. 148 (by implication of words in will).
8 Mardis, Admrx. v. Steen, supra,
